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Brigade-level decision making
A US Army brigade includes an impressive range of assets and capabilities: thousands of professional soldiers and officers, hundreds of combat and support vehicles, helicopters, sophisticated intelligence and communication equipment and specialists, artillery and missiles, engineers, medical units, repair shops, and much more. In a battle, these assets might perform hundreds of complex tasks of multiple types: collecting intelligence; movements; direct and indirect fires; constructing roads, bridges, and obstacles; transporting and handling supplies; managing the civilian population; command and control, and so on.
Detailed planning of a military operationwhether a battle with an enemy or a peacekeeping operation-requires an intensive effort of highly trained professionals, the brigade planning staff. To accomplish this effort, the Army teaches and uses a methodologically rigorous process called the Military Decision Making Process. 1 A primary staff of four or five officers, usually ranging in rank from captain to lieutenant colonel, typically perform MDMP, with the support of a considerable-sized subordinate staff. The process normally takes from two to eight hours. The physical environment often consists of • A tent extended from the back of one or several Army light trucks or armored command-andcontrol vehicles • Folding tables • Maps hung on the tent walls and covered with acetate sheets on which the officers draw symbols of units and arrows of movements
The input for the staff's effort comes usually from the unit commander in the form of the commander's intent, concept of operation, and desired end state for the operation-a high-level specification of the operation. The staff uses this information to develop course of action sketches (for example, see Figure  1 ) and statements. In effect, COA sketches and statements comprise a set of high-level actions, goals, and sequencing, referring largely to the friendly forces' movements and objectives-for example, "Task Force Arrow attacks along axis Bull to complete the destruction of the 2nd Red Battalion."
With this input, the planning staff works as a team to examine the most critical elements of the friendly Figure 2 ). The chart's columns represent time periods. The rows contain functional classes of actions, such as Maneuver (which in turn includes such subclasses as Main Effort and Security), Combat Service Support (for example, logistics), Military Intelligence, and so on. This plan-schedule's content, recorded largely in the matrix cells, includes the tasks and actions of the friendly force's subunits and assets, their objectives and manner of execution, expected timing, dependencies and synchronization, routes and locations, availability of supplies, combat losses, enemy situation and actions, and so on.
How can decision aids help MDMP?
It's easy to see numerous areas that need dramatic improvements and that might be helped by the judicious introduction of computer aids. 2 Currently, manual products cannot be reused downstream in the process. Multiple reentry of information and merely the creation of multiple overlays take time. Even when the product's format is ostensibly "electronic"-for example, a PowerPoint presentation-the result is not a true digitization; it lacks semantic content and cannot be readily reused in the downstream processes and tools. Could a better set of tools that can capture the digital information's semantics address this deficiency?
Remaining essentially manual, the current process is time and labor consuming. Much of this consumption of staff hours involves computational tasks such as logistics consumption and time-space analysis, which could at least in theory be allocated to a computer aid.
The manual process's time demands force the staff to drastically limit the number and diversity of options they can explore and analyze. Perhaps an intelligent computer aid could explore a greater range of options, letting the staff analyze more options in the same amount of time or more deeply analyze the same number of options.
The dichotomy of planning and execution remains pervasive. The gulf separating the two is unacceptably wide, partly because today's planning process is far too slow to be merged effectively into decision making during execution of operations. If computer aids make fast, real-time planning and replanning possible, would this enable a major step toward integrating planning and execution?
The Army's corporate knowledge continuously evolves, and the rate of this evolution and adaptation has increased under the pressure of multiple factors: new military-political realities, the threat of terrorism, and the rise in operations other than conventional war, to name just a few. Effective mechanisms for capturing and transmitting such knowledge are elusive. Could computer decision aids (which by necessity must contain some of the warrior's knowledge, continuously updated) become one such mechanism?
How might they hinder MDMP?
In spite of decision aids' potential benefits in MDMP, their roles, limitations, and utilization in military environments are justifiably open to serious questions and concerns:
Will they inhibit the agility and dynamics of command, forcing greater reliance on slow and bureaucratic processes and commandby-plan, and reducing latitude for tactical commanders?
Will such computer aids impose extensive training and specialization requirements, turning warriors into narrow-focused computer tool operators?
Will they encourage excessive fixation on analytical aspects of command, by the book and by numbers, detracting from the intuitive, adaptive, art-like aspects of military command decision making?
Will they engender undue dependence of future commanders and staff on technology that might be vulnerable in a combat environment? After all, hasn't it been said, and with great justification, that "a map with a bullet hole in it is still a map, but a computer with a bullet hole in it is a doorstop?" Will they make the plans and actions more predictable to the enemy?
The ICCES experiments
Experimental investigation can clarify, if not necessarily resolve, some of these issues. That was the rationale behind ICCES. We focused on COA planning and analysis: from documenting and communicating a high-level COA to producing a detailed analysis and plan of tasks. The experiments' scope did not include the highly creative step of inventing a high-level COA. [3] [4] [5] To further circumscribe the experiments' scope (subject as always to budgetary constraints), we focused on the planning process at the Army brigade echelon.
The experimental rig
To provide computer-aided support to the selected aspects of MDMP, we identified several existing, advanced R&D prototype tools. We then modified them lightly and integrated them loosely and inexpensively into a conceptually seamless suite of decision aids (see Figure 3 ). The resulting "rig" offered a basis for conducting practical experiments structured around the staff process's key tasks.
The COA Creator tool, developed by Northwestern University's Qualitative Reasoning Group, lets a user sketch a COA into the computer. 6 Although superficially similar to familiar drawing tools, COA Creator is fundamentally different in that it stores semantic knowledge-based representations in the computer for each item users add to the COA sketch. See the "COA Creator" sidebar for more details.
We modified Alphatech's COA statement tool to let staff planners enter the COA statement. This tool uses carefully designed templates and a tightly constrained grammar to enable users to formulate sentences that can be parsed into appropriate internal representations. Our tool automatically filled in some templates with elements derived from the sketch, such as units and tasks, so that the sentences could refer to the sketch. The system lets planners construct sentences such as these: CAVBN2 in order to prevent REDINBN17 and REDARCAVBN2 from engage in offensive operations. Fires will suppress OBJ CUB, then suppress OBJ ROYALS, then suppress OBJ BRAVES, then suppress OBJ BREWERS.
The sketch and statement that a planning staff currently produces during COA development reflect different aspects of the COA. Although they go hand in hand, they each contain unique information that cannot be gleaned from the other ("purpose" for example, cannot be easily inferred from a COA sketch but is usually clearly defined in the statement). These two distinct aspects also compelled us to use two different tools-COA Creator and the COA statement tool-that capture the COA's content from two distinct perspectives. So, we needed a mechanism that could merge the digital representations of sketch and statement into a unified product. For this task, we used Teknowledge's Fusion Engine, which generated a single information file from the two separate sources and eliminated inconsistencies between the information. Additionally, Teknowledge built an XML translator to translate the knowledge fragments into the XML schema needed for the next system in the experiment.
After the digital representation of the sketch and statement information is properly fused and translated, it goes to the Course of Action Development and Evaluation Tool. CADET, developed by the Carnegie Group (now owned by BBN Technologies), transforms the sketch and statement into a detailed battle plan. For additional details, see the "CADET" sidebar.
Once the COA is truly digitized, a tool such as CADET can automatically (or with human guidance) perform the detailed planning, including the traditionally time-consuming tasks such as time-distance analysis, logistics calculations (for example, see Figure 4 ), and attrition calculations.
We linked these tools mainly via file transfer, crudely but sufficient for exercising a carefully controlled experiment. The overall rig supported a logical method of operation for the planning staff, proceeding through a sequence of steps analogous to the manual process:
1. Enter the COA sketch into COA Creator; then discuss and modify it (for example, see Figure 5 ). 2. Enter the COA statement into the statement tool; then discuss and modify it. Potentially, the entire process would take only a few minutes (excluding the manual generation of the textual plans and orders).
But would it work?
The primary experiment Our first experiment, which took three days, involved eight Army officers (majors and lieutenant colonels) at BCBL-L facilities. All the subjects were from combat arms branches and had a variety of tactical experience, with 11 to 23 years of active service. None had prior technical backgrounds, COA (course of action) Creator is based on the nuSketch multimodal sketching architecture, 1,2 which emphasizes rich visual and conceptual understanding of what is drawn. This tool uses an "overlay" approach to graphics that lets users switch graphics on and off easily in a fashion that is analogous to taking acetate graphics on and off a map, which is the current practice. COA Creator avoids using recognition by explicit conceptual labeling and manual segmentation of the ink that constitutes glyphs (symbols). The visual processing includes extracting qualitative spatial and configural relationships among the glyphs. The tool is doctrinally based, to let military users work in a familiar domain environment. COA Creator takes its conceptual representations from domain theories created by the DARPA High-Performance Knowledge Bases community (http://reliant.teknowledge.com/ HPKB), using the Cyc knowledge base (www.cyc.com) as a starting point. A specialized inference engine performs reasoning. The tool is also speech enabled, but for the Integrated Course of Action Critiquing and Elaboration System (ICCES) experiment (see the main article), users employed drag-and-drop functionalities.
but all possessed basic computer skills with MS Office products such as PowerPoint and Word.
On Day One, the officers learned how to use the system. The training, which took four hours, consisted of walking the users through a complete scenario of COA development (sketch and statement) and COA expansion within ICCES. After describing each system in the experiment, the instructor developed a sample COA, with the students following along on their own machines. Given the limited resources, the users worked in pairs, but each had opportunities to manipulate the software. Observers noted the users'performance. At the training's end, we divided the users into two roughly equivalent groups of four on the basis of their tactical skills and experience and their demonstrated technical skills during the training.
On Day Two, each group conducted MDMP, given a tactical scenario. One group (the control group) used the traditional, manual process; the other used ICCES. Each group received the same plan and briefing from their simulated higher headquarters, and both groups could ask questions to ensure that they understood the plan (similar to how military units request additional information to ensure that they understand orders). Once the groups were confident that they understood the high-level plan and their requirements, they organized and conducted their planning activities. We told each group that at the day's end they had to deliver three COA sketches and statements and one COA synchronization matrix. The matrix was to reflect the COA they had chosen as their "best" COA with a level of detail that would allow the plan's execution. The groups did not receive a specific time limit to complete their planning, but observers monitored times for postexperiment analysis.
Day Three involved the same procedures as Day Two, but the control group became the automated group and vice versa. The scenario was slightly different from Day Two's but had comparable complexity. Both groups had to provide the same products as generated in Day Two.
Although the experiment provided valuable data and insights (which we discuss later), several considerations prevent us from claiming statistical significance for our results. First, there were too few groups and trials. Second, although we formed the groups to try to achieve parity regarding their tactical and technical abilities, we could not completely account for human factors such as personalities. Finally, by switching the groups' roles from Day Two to Day Three, we introduced other uncontrollable variables into the experiment, such as team building within the groups and the initial control group's ability to retain their training from Day One to Day Three with regard to manipulating the software.
The auxiliary experiment
We conducted an additional series of experiments focused on the detailed planning and scheduling step of MDMP that CADET performs. We'll call this series the "auxiliary experiment" to distinguish it from the primary experiment described in the previous section. The auxiliary experiment involved one user, nine judges (active-duty officers, mainly 
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The Course of Action Development and Evaluation Tool (http://cadet.bbn.com) takes a formal specification of a course of action (high-level objectives, friendly and enemy units, terrain, and so on) and generates a detailed battle plan (including timing and logistics estimates). 1 CADET obtains the COA specification from a variety of interfaces such as COA Creator (see the related sidebar). The algorithm interleaves incremental steps of planning, routing, scheduling, and attrition and consumption estimates. For planning, CADET uses a knowledge-based approach of the hierarchical-task-network type. Both domain-specific and constraint-guided heuristics drive allocation and scheduling of tasks to assets. Routing minimizes the aggregation of measures such as travel time and enemy threat. Within the interleaved process, CADET uses rules to determine the enemy's probable actions and reactions as well as friendly counteractions, approximating the common action-reaction-counteraction technique of manual wargaming. The resulting digital product can be displayed in many different forms, such as a traditional synchronization matrix (see the section "Brigade-level decision making" in the main article) or an animated map. 
Division Support Command
Corps Support Command colonels and lieutenant colonels), and five scenarios obtained from several US Army exercises. The scenarios were all brigade-sized and offensive but differed significantly in terrain, mix of friendly forces, nature of opposing forces, and scheme of maneuver. For each scenario and COA we located the COA sketches assigned to each planning staff and the synchronization matrices that each planning staff produced. The judges, experienced observers of many planning exercises, estimated that typically a team of four to five officers performs an exercise in three to four hours, for a total of approximately 16 person-hours per planning product. Using these scenarios and COAs, we had CADET generate automatically detailed plans and express them as synchronization matrices. The user, a retired US Army officer, reviewed and edited the matrices. The editing was light-in all cases it involved changing or deleting less than 3 percent of the matrix's entries. This was less editing than in the primary experiment, probably because CADET's user in the auxiliary experiment was more familiar with the tool and trusted it more than the primary experiment's users. This reflected that we don't expect CADET to be used purely automatically but rather in collaboration with a human decision maker. The entire process took less than two minutes of CADET execution and approximately 20 minutes of review and post-editing, for a total of approximately 0.4 person-hour per product. We transferred the resulting matrices to an Excel spreadsheet and gave them the same visual style as that of human-generated sets.
We organized the products of both CADET and the human staff into packages and submitted them to the nine judges. Each package consisted of a sketch and statement (manually generated), a synchronization matrix combined with attrition and consumption estimates, and a questionnaire with grading instructions. The judges did not know whether a planning product was produced by the traditional manual process or with computerized aids. To avoid evaluation bias, we randomized the assignment of packages to judges. Each judge received four packages. Each judge reviewed a package and graded its products on a scale from 0 to 10, with 5 defined as "comparable to typical products in today's practice."
Observations and lessons learned
In the primary experiment, significant observations began during training. In spite of the modest time allocated to training, users exhibited no hesitation or difficulties in operating the system that suggested they needed additional training. This was all the more notable because most of the training focused on the workarounds necessitated by the system's limited integration. For example, we had to train the users how to pass files between the system components and how to avoid a crash-prone situation. None of this should be necessary in a mature, fully-developed system. Even with this overhead, training took only four hours. Without the overhead, we estimate that training would take less than an hour.
A key factor allowing the low training requirements and rapid, easy learning curve was the use of a sketch-based multimodal interface. COA Creator uses the nuSketch approach to multimodal interfaces. 7, 8 This approach, like other multimodal interface systems such as QuickSet, 9 exploits the naturalness of drawing and visual annotations for communicating with software. Although QuickSet has proven very useful, nuSketch had several advantages for this task. QuickSet focuses on providing recognition services as interfaces to legacy computer systems; its "smarts" are in statistical recognizers for visual symbols, speech and natural language understanding, and integrating these information sources into commands for the underlying software system. In contrast, nuSketch-based systems focus on a rich conceptual understanding of the domain, spatial reasoning about the user's ink, and clever interface design instead of recognition.
These differences were important for this task in several ways. First, the conceptual understanding of the domain that COA Creator uses provided the representational framework that CADET needs to do its work. Second, our system did not need extensive pretraining of speech vocabularies and grammars, unlike QuickSet or any system using existing speech recognition technology. (Although speech recognition is useful in many applications, today's technology has severe limitations for battlefield use, including sensitivity to environmental noise and operator stress, user-specific training of the software, and training operators to work with limited vocabularies and grammars. Technology advances will change this over time, but it is worth being wary about near-future applications of speech recognition in battlefield systems.) Instead, officers used the software equivalent of push buttons to indicate the intended meaning of their ink as they drew. So, they could draw complex shapes, which today's statistical-recognition technologies cannot handle. They could also deal with interruptions such as conversations with fellow officers. Interruptions cause problems for most multimodal interfaces, which inter- pret pauses or lifting the pen as a signal that the user has completed a drawing.
Other factors contributing to the low training requirements were the intentionally simple, straightforward process flow and usersystem interaction. These consisted of the sequence of steps outlined earlier in the section "The experimental rig," which the users readily accepted as natural and consistent with their prior training and experience in manual MDMP.
In fact, the users displayed preferences for further simplifying the process. For example, they stated that they would prefer a single process of entering the sketch and statement rather than the two sequential steps that they had to perform in ICCES. The users further demonstrated their desire for simple, straightforward operation by the way they used the COA statement tool. They consistently looked for and asked for one simple way to enter the statement, and shied away from the rich, flexible, but necessarily complex approach the tool offered. We'll return to this issue in our conclusion.
Consistent with the preference for simple operation were the users' requests for a mechanism that would let them perform easy modifications and iterations within the process. They particularly wanted to make changes in the CADET-produced synchronization matrix and see those changes automatically reflected in the COA sketch and statement. Although such a capability is technically feasible, ICCES didn't have it during the experiment.
The users were generally satisfied with the quality of the planning products that ICCES generated. The group using ICCES made only a few changes to the automatically generated product-that is, the highly detailed synchronization matrix (for example, see Figure  2 ). The users manually edited only approximately 10 to 15 percent of the entries in the matrix, indicating that they agreed with the overwhelming majority of the plan that ICCES produced. After the editing, the products compared favorably with the control group's products. For example, the COAs that both groups produced, when wargamed either manually or through ICCES, all resulted in roughly the same estimates for time to complete the mission and overall attrition of friendly forces.
We confirmed this observation with regard to CADET in the auxiliary experiment, which used a greater number of test cases and multiple unbiased judges to compare the products of the manual and computerized processes. The results demonstrate little difference between CADET's and human performance. Figure 6 illustrates this by comparing the grade probability distributions (the x-axis) for the CADET-supported and manual processes. The curves (approximated as normal distributions) are nearly identical. To put it differently, on the basis of the mean of grades, CADET won-that is, got higher grades than the humans performing the manual process-in two of the five scenarios, lost in two, and tied in one. Taking the mean of grades for all five scenarios, CADET earned 4.2 and humans earned 4.4, with the standard deviation of approximately 2.0, an insignificant difference.
The auxiliary experiment's basic conclusion is clear: the judges gave CADET-produced products (which took typically approximately 20 minutes to produce) essentially the same level of grades they gave human-produced products (which took on the order of 16 person-hours to produce).
On the other hand, users were dissatisfied with the products' presentation. The synchronization matrix is an accepted way of recording COA analysis results. However, users had difficulty comprehending the ICCES-generated matrix, even though the system presented it in a very conventional, presumably familiar manner. Perhaps the synchronization matrix functions well only as a mechanism for shorthand recording of your own mental process. Consequently, the same synchronization matrix is not nearly as effective when presenting the results of someone else's-for example, a computer tool's-reasoning process. In effect, the synchronization matrix serves as a textual representation of a visual process. The problem was further exacerbated because the ICCES-generated matrices were unusually detailed and therefore large. Users had difficulty navigating within this large volume of information. We've concluded that a system such as ICCES should incorporate qualitative simulation and animation to visually present the expanded plan to the user.
Of the greatest practical significance were those observations that confirmed the potential for significantly reducing the time and labor that a typical MDMP cycle requires. In particular, wargaming could be shortened by several hours. The feasibility of obtaining such time savings with a decision aid is neither trivial nor obvious. Some steps of the computer-aided process-for example, entering the COA into the system or reviewing and modifying the products-could be very time consuming and could offset the time savings obtained in other steps. However, once the information is digitized, great time savings accrue in the downstream processes, particularly in the step that generates a detailed battle plan. To put it differently, no one ICCES component can deliver time savings, but a system of such components can. O ur experiments confirm that you can use AI techniques to create natural sketch-based interfaces that domain experts can use with little training. The nuSketch approach provides a practical method of expressing COA sketches with today's technology. As we mentioned previously, one important limitation was the users' desire for a single tool that captures COA sketches and statements simultaneously. This approach could be extended to provide a unified mapbased interface to do both tasks, but this would require additional research exploiting advances in natural language understanding and dialogue management. Another research opportunity is to use the rich representations in COA Creator as inputs to other support tools such as critiquers, pattern completion tools (for hypotheses about the enemy's intent), and tools for accessing previous plans via analogy. 10 Such capabilities could be incrementally added to near-future deployed systems as they become available, given a stable semantic framework.
With the semantically rich input that a tool such as COA Creator can provide, techniques of tightly interleaved adversarial planning and scheduling, such as those applied in CADET in our experiment, can help create thoroughly detailed plans comparable in quality to manually generated plans but dramatically faster. Decision aids combining natural COA sketch interfaces and a fullfunctionality COA expansion mechanism can indeed help dramatically increase the staff planning process's speed and agility, potentially bringing it into an integrated planning-execution cycle.
Furthermore, tools such as ICCES offer an important opportunity for knowledge capture, particularly by accumulating COAs in a machine-understandable form. Another kind of knowledge capture occurs when maintaining and extending the underlying knowledge bases that such systems use. Tools for developing such knowledge bases are needed; this challenging topic is receiving considerable attention in efforts such as DARPA'S Rapid Knowledge Formation program.
Regarding the concern that such decision aids might adversely impact the creative aspects of the art of war, our experiments indicated no adverse effects on the creativity of the plans produced. The products of the ICCES-assisted groups were no less imaginative than the manual ones. This is because the high-level COA inputted into the system came directly from the user, while the software focused on the process's lower-level, more mechanical aspects. The restraints on the user were doctrinal restraints that also affect the manual process.
As one participant noted, the system merely provided him the tools to apply his concept of doctrine. No tool is a substitute for training, doctrine, and the decision makers' personal qualities. And, regardless of tools, the decision makers are ultimately responsible for defining their approach and decision-making style. Although tools do lead to changes in the details and form of the process, the experiment offered no evidence that such tools will inhibit or dictate the substantive aspects of decision making. Different commanders and staffs, with different styles, will use such tools to leverage their own preferences and strengths.
Also, no evidence exists that a tool such as ICCES would in any way increase predictability of the plans or would encourage a "cookbook" approach. To the contrary, because these tools let staff planners explore rapidly a broader range of possible COAs, including those that are more unconventional and out-of-the-box, they have the potential to encourage greater ingenuity, creativity, and adaptivity.
Overall, the experiment suggests that the ICCES concept is a practical paradigm for a planning-staff decision aid, with near-future deployment potential. Staff officers would have such a tool available on a rugged, lightweight, highly portable device, such as a PDA, linked to other such devices via tactical Internet. The decision-aid tool, in keeping with ICCES lessons, would be tightly integrated and capable of producing complex operational plans and orders rapidly, with minimal manual input. It would have simple, straightforward, and natural operation and be easy to learn and use, even in stressful field conditions. An officer would use it routinely to plan tactical operations, collaborate with others while on the move and dispersed over the battlefield, issue operational plans and orders, and monitor and modify the plans as the operation executes and the situation evolves. Furthermore, as ICCES demonstrated, current AI technology is not far from being directly incorporated into such a practical tool.
Overall, the experiment suggests that the ICCES concept is a practical paradigm for a planning-staff decision aid, with near-future deployment potential.
